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The Economies of Mileage Restrictions 
for Railway Workers in Western Canada 
Wayne Simpson 
and 
Frank Peters 
The purpose ofthis paper is to examine the économies ofthe 
mileage payment System, to understand the problems createdfor 
the union and C.P.R. management and ta examinepotential solu-
tions to the problem. 
The collective agreement between Canadian Pacific Limited and the 
United Transportation Union on behalf of the conductors, baggagemen, 
brakemen, car retarder operators, yardmen and switchtenders employed in 
the Prairie and Pacific régions expired December 31, 1981. An important 
feature of the compensation System for thèse workers is a wage rate per mile 
combined with mileage restrictions, including both a minimum guarantee 
and a maximum per month of employment {Collective Agreement, 1979). 
This mileage payment system is likely to be an issue in fortheoming negotia-
tions since union members, particularly those in British Columbia, hâve 
voiced their displeasure about the mileage limits1. The purpose ofthis paper 
is to examine the économies of the mileage payment system, to understand 
the problems that it has created for the union and C.P.R. management and 
to examine potential solutions to the problem. 
The paper is divided into three sections. The first section describes the 
mileage payment system and places it in an économie framework. The se-
cond section analyzes the économie basis for disaffection with the system by 
union rank and file members and, perhaps, by the C.P.R. as well. The third 
section provides concluding remarks on the likely outeome of negotiations. 
* SIMPSON, Wayne and Frank PETERS, Professors, Department of Economies, The 
University of Manitoba. 
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î In May, 1981, this discontent was reflected in a work slowdown over lack of time for 
hot meals, (The Globe and Mail, May 22, 25 and 26, 1981). 
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THE MILEAGE PAYMENT SYSTEM 
Workers engaged in the movement of freight and passengers at C.P.R. 
are paid a fixed rate per mile while the train is moving. When the train is 
stopped at a terminal — to perform switching opérations, for example — 
workers are paid at the rate of twelve and one-half miles per hour. Wages 
are therefore determined strictly on a mileage basis. 
From the standpoint of the employer, there is no incentive to limit the 
miles worked per employée until either (a) they are required to pay overtime 
premiums by the Canada Labour Code; (b) they believe that the productivi-
ty of employées per mile worked is declining; or (c) they believe that the 
safety of passengers, employées, trains, or equipment is jeopardized2. The 
reason for this is that the employer incurs quasi-fixed labour costs, or costs 
that vary at least partly with the number of employées rather than their 
hours worked (Oi, 1962). Administrative costs and visual acuity tests in the 
recruitment of trainmen are one example. Another example is the 
engineman training program in which trainmen receive $400 per week for 30 
weeks plus a bonus of $2800-$3000 at the end of the course. Other quasi-
fixed labour costs include health insurance, life insurance and employée in-
jury insurance provided by C.P.R. plus their contributions to Unemploy-
ment Insurance and the Canada Pension Plan. Minimization of quasi-fixed 
labour costs requires the minimization of the number of employées, or the 
maximization of mileage per employée, at least until conditions (a) to (c) are 
encountered. 
Mileage restrictions and guarantees are likely to be sought by the 
union, however, for two reasons. First, the maximization of mileage per 
employée (subject to (a), (b) and (c)) may jeopardize the employment of 
union members, particularly in a contracting industry such as railway 
transportation. Hence many junior employées can be expected to support 
mileage restrictions to préserve their jobs, provided that some income level 
is guaranteed that is compétitive with alternative employment oppor-
tunities. Secondly, many junior and senior employées may not wish to work 
the mileage that is optimal from the standpoint of the employer. Thèse 
workers would prefer more leisure under prevailing économie and social 
conditions. On the other hand, there is a mileage level below which they 
would clearly prefer less leisure and more income. Once a mileage max-
imum and minimum can be found that is approved by a majority of union 
members drawn from thèse two groups then it becomes a collective bargain-
2 It seems likely that (b) and (c) will not occur prior to (a), given reasonable scheduling 
and procédures. 
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ing issue. It is not surprising, therefore, that mileage régulations were in-
itiated by the union and not the employer. 
The C.P.R. has some incentive to provide mileage guarantees because 
many of the quasi-fixed labour costs noted above are employee-specific. If 
there is inadéquate work temporarily for junior employées they hâve a 
strong incentive to look for work elsewhere if there is no income guarantee 
at the C.P.R. If they are successful in finding a new job and unavailable to 
return to the C.P.R., such costs as training and recruiting of that employée 
are lost. Henre there is a well-documented incentive to hoard labour 
(Seidule and Newton, 1980) where such quasi-fixed labour costs are signifi-
cant, in particular among more senior workers. The C.P.R.'s willingness to 
hoard labour during temporary déclines in business activity would make 
them réceptive to some form of mileage guarantee to employées. 
The resuit of collective bargaining has been a mileage maximum of 
3800 miles per month plus mileage minima (provided that employées do not 
request fewer hours) of 3000 miles for regular workers and 2600 miles for 
less senior workers on the spareboard. Given the stronger économie incen-
tives for the union than management to initiate such restrictions, particular-
ly the mileage ceiling, it is useful to depict mileage restrictions as the out-
come of the gênerai préférences of union members, or intraorganizational 
bargaining. Thèse préférences can be represented by a set of indifférence 
curves for the médian voter in the union (Farber, 1978) as shown in Figure 
1. Given the available trade-off AB between income (the negotiated wage 
multiplied by miles worked) and leisure, the unionist chooses the point C 
which maximizes his satisfaction at, say 3800 miles per month. This restric-
tion will be instituted and retained so long as économie conditions and the 
préférence of union members stay the same. 
DISAFFECTION WITH THE MILEAGE SYSTEM 
In depicting mileage restrictions as the outeome of intra-union bargain-
ing, we hâve made it clear that a minority of workers may be dissatisfied 
with the resuit. In this case, the major group would be senior workers with 
job security who are "underworked" at 3800 miles per month (Perlman, 
1969, ch. 1). That is, they hâve stronger préférences for income over leisure 
and hence their indifférence curves are flatter than those depicted in Figure 
1. Yet as long as circumstances do not change they cannot alter the union 
position. 
What may account for growing disaffection with thèse mileage restric-
tions and some potentially effective movement to change this aspect of the 
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agreement? From the model in Figure 1 we hâve two explanations — 
changes in tastes and changes in économie conditions. While it may be 
tempting to appeal to changing membership tastes for income and leisure, 
this route is generally considered only as a last resort. If tastes do change 
over time among members, it is not clear why they would change in one par-
ticular direction en masse and why changes in one union member's 
préférences for less leisure would not be offset by changes in another 
member's préférences for more leisure. 
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FIGURE 1 
Consider, then, possible changes in the économie circumstances of 
union members over time. Although negotiated wage increases apply to ail 
western Canadian members of the union, the increases do not turn out to be 
équivalent. The reason for this is différences in consumer priées within 
western Canada. An examination of the most récent figures and the 
longterm trend illustrâtes the point. In March 1981, the consumer price in-
dex had increased 14.7% in the previous twelve months in Vancouver, 
13.9% in Calgary, 12.6% in Edmonton, 12.2% in Regina and 11.3% in 
Winnipeg (Statistics Canada, 1981). Furthermore, a study by the Con-
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ference Board of Canada found living costs in Vancouver to be 23% higher 
than those in Calgary which in turn were 18% higher than those in Win-
nipeg3. 
Since régional wage differentials are insignificant in the current agree-
ment,4 the uniform mileage rates imply that union members receive a lower 
real wage per mile as one moves westward within western Canada. The 
resuit is that union members do not face the same économie conditions, as 
shown in Figure 2. The trade-off BE between real income and leisure for 
western members is less steeply sloped to reflect a lower real wage. The con-
séquent différence in preferred amounts of leisure dépends on the tastes of 
unionists. The évidence on labour supply in the United States5 has shown 
quite conclusively, however, that there are strong préférences for income 
among prime âge maies 25 to 54 years of âge (Cain and Watts, 1973; Ad-
dison and Siebert, 1979). That is, the income effect dominâtes the substitu-
tion effect such that as real wages fall, railway workers, who are 
predominantly prime âge maies, will choose more work whenever possible 
to recover income. This increased work cornes at the expense of less leisure, 
although leisure has become cheaper as a resuit of the lower real wage. 
More work will provide greater satisfaction and move them to a higher in-
différence curve. Hence the lower real wages for C.P.R. employées living 
further west can account for the différences in attitude toward the ap-
propriate amount of work, or mileage restrictions, that should operate. In 
turn, the growing gap in real wages between eastern and western workers 
would account for the growing disaffection with présent arrangements in 
British Columbia and Alberta. 
The disaffection among unionists with current financial arrangements 
might be expected to receive sympathy from the employer because of dif-
ficulties in recruiting and retaining labour in the western part of the région. 
Since the wage rates paid by most other firms are determined solely by local 
économie conditions, it would be expected that wage increases would reflect 
local cost-of-living increases6. As a resuit other firms would offer more 
compétitive compensation to railway workers in the western part of the 
région than in the eastern part of it. Recruitment and turnover problems 
3 Thèse comparisons were based on a typical middle management lifestyle ( Winnipeg 
Free Press, June 17, 1981), but the différences are sufficiently large that the intraurban pattern 
is likely to apply to other incomes as well. 
4 They are primarily restricted to the interior of British Columbia and they are insuffi-
cient to cover cost-of-living differentials (Collective Agreement, 1979). 
5 We are still awaiting the first comparable study in Canada. 
6 Otherwise workers would migrate from areas with low real wages to areas with high 
real wages creating upward pressure on wages in the former areas and downward pressure on 
wages in the latter areas. 
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would be expected to be most prévalent in B.C. and Alberta, making the 
C.P.R. réceptive to new financial arrangements that would make railway 
employment more attractive in those provinces. 
§ 
There would seem to be a more appropriate solution to the problem 
than changes in mileage limitations — régional wage rate differentials to 
reflect différences in the cost-of-living. There are, however, reasons why 
this solution may not be chosen. The solution implies that workers in 
Saskatchewan and Manitoba, in particular, must be willing to accept much 
smaller than average increases so that workers in Alberta and British Col-
umbia can receive increases well above the average. Since average wage in-
creases hâve not kept up with inflation recently this means that such an 
agreement could likely be reached only if railway workers in Manitoba and 
Saskatchewan accepted significant real wage déclines or if the employer 
were willing to add significantly to the cost of a settlement to provide such 
differentials. Neither concession seems likely given worker resistence to 
significant real wage déclines and employer préférence for higher mileage 
limitations (and hence fewer employées) rather than initially costly régional 
wage differentials. 
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THE LIKELY OUTCOME OF NEGOTIATIONS 
Negotiations are therefore likely to produce not régional wage differen-
tials but relaxation of mileage restrictions. This solution should appease 
unionists in British Columbia and Alberta, at least temporarily, without 
depriving their counterparts in Manitoba and Saskatchewan of anticipated 
wage increases. The solution will reduce the quasi-fixed labour costs of 
C.P.R. by reducing the amount of new hiring that will be required in Alber-
ta and British Columbia. At the same time it will reduce turnover and 
perhaps enhance recruitment of new railway workers in those provinces. It 
would appear that ail parties gain by this solution as long as safety and 
employée productivity are not jeopardized7. 
This bargaining outcome may be given impetus by the fact that mileage 
limitations are already 4300 miles per month for comparable employées at 
the C.N.R. in western Canada. This paper has argued, however, that the 
pressures for higher mileage ceilings are économie in nature and would 
therefore apply to the situation that C.N.R. railway workers face as well. 
This argument has concentrated on utility maximizing union behaviour 
given a choice between earnings and leisure as the économie force dictating 
the ultimate outcome for ail western Canadian railway workers~and has 
thereby admittedly ignored more detailed considération of such factors as 
union democracy, non-wage compensation, the production process, and 
collective bargaining stratégies. 
Insofar as this analysis is valid, it suggests that this solution may not be 
a lasting one. If the gap in the cost-of-living index continues to grow, 
pressure from western unionists in the unit will again mount and be accom-
panied by further C.P.R. (and C.N.R.) staffing difficulties in that part of 
the région. Continued relaxation of mileage restrictions is limited, however, 
by barriers (a), (b) and (c) noted above. Unionists in British Columbia and 
Alberta are also likely to hâve some limits to their willingness to work more 
hours than their brothers in Saskatchewan and Manitoba to compensate for 
lower real wages. Hence, pressure may grow for alternative solutions such 
as régional pay differentials. Such potential developments would suggest 
that there could be harder bargaining ahead to résolve the pay problem, not 
only with C.P.R. (and C.N.R.) but among western Canadian railway 
unionists themselves. 
7 In économie terms, the solution is Pareto superior to the current situation. 
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La rémunération au parcours des cheminots 
dans VOuest canadien 
La convention collective conclue entre le Canadien Pacifique et le Syndicat des 
employés des transports dans l'Ouest du Canada contient un système de rémunéra-
tion fondé sur un taux de salaire au parcours comportant un kilométrage maximal et 
minimal. Le présent article étudie les données économiques de ce système de rémuné-
ration au parcours de manière à identifier et à faire comprendre les problèmes de 
négociation collective qu'il engendre. 
La première partie décrit le système de rémunération au kilométrage et le replace 
dans son contexte économique. Bien qu'il soit plus probable que l'employeur veuille 
limiter les parcours effectués par l'employé à cause de coûts de travail à peu près 
fixes, le syndicat voudrait, par cette limitation, protéger les emplois ainsi que le 
temps consacré aux loisirs de ses membres. Pour sa part, l'employeur veut possible-
ment établir un kilométrage garanti de façon à réduire toutefois le roulement de la 
main-d'oeuvre lorsqu'il y a diminution du trafic. C'est pour ce motif que l'on a 
négocié un parcours maximal de 3 800 milles et un parcours minimal de 2 600 à 3 000 
milles par mois. Du côté du syndicat, on a considéré le kilométrage maximal comme 
étant le résultat de la négociation et comme s'il représentait pour le membre du rang 
le choix entre le kilométrage effectué et le temps libre. 
La deuxième partie de l'article analyse les motifs économiques de la désaffection 
croissante du syndicat pour le système de rémunération au parcours. Les augmenta-
tions de la rémunération au parcours négociées ne sont pas équivalentes parce que les 
prix à la consommation sont plus élevés et, par conséquent, les gains réels plus bas à 
mesure que l'on se déplace vers l'Ouest à l'intérieur de l'unité de négociation. Face à 
une rémunération plus faible en gains réels, il était manifeste que les syndiqués de 
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l'Alberta et de la Colombie Britannique opteraient pour un parcours plus long afin 
de récupérer ce qu'ils perdaient en gains réels. En conséquence, beaucoup de syndi-
qués de ces deux provinces s'opposent aux limitations de parcours, et le Canadien 
Pacifique peut se montrer sympathique à leur cause, comme moyen de faciliter le 
recrutement des employés et de réduire le roulement de la main-d'oeuvre. 
Une des solutions pourrait consister dans l'établissement de taux différents de 
salaire selon les régions. L'application de taux différents de salaire semble improba-
ble si les syndiqués du Manitoba et de la Saskatchewan ne veulent pas accepter une 
diminution de leurs gains réels et si le Canadien Pacifique ne veut pas absorber le 
coût total de taux de rémunération au parcours plus élevé en Alberta et en Colombie 
Britannique. 
La dernière partie de l'article traite des résultats probables des négociations sur 
les restrictions des parcours. De préférence à un système de rémunération fondé sur 
des taux différents de salaire, l'abandon des restrictions au kilométrage est ce qui est 
plus probable dans l'avenir. Cependant, si les écarts dans les prix à la consommation 
continuent de croître, cette solution deviendra moins satisfaisante et l'établissement 
de taux de salaire différents selon les régions deviendra plus attrayant. 
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